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THE IMPLICATIONS OF MENO’S
PARADOX FOR THE MENTAL
CAPACITY ACT 2005
PAUL SKOWRON*
Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
ABSTRACT
Meno’s paradox—which asks ‘how will you know it is the thing you didn’t know?’—
appears in Plato’s dialogue of the same name. This article suggests that a similar ques-
tion arises in some supportive relationships. Attention to this question clariﬁes one
condition necessary to justify making a best interests decisions against someone’s will:
the decided-for person must be unable to recognise that they have failed to recognise a
need. From this condition, two duties are derived: a duty to ensure that someone can-
not recognise that they have failed to recognise a need before making a decision against
their will; and a duty to provide consensual support to those who have had decisions
made against their will, in order to help them to avoid such second-order failures of rec-
ognition in the future. The article assesses the Mental Capacity Act 2005 against each of
these duties. For each duty, it ﬁnds that the Act allows compliance, but does not
robustly require it.
KEYWORDS: Advocacy, Care Act, Epistemology, Mental Capacity, Paradox, Decision-
Making
I . INTRODUCTION
When, if ever, is it right to make a decision for another person that they object
to? The question seems to be intractable. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (the
MCA) provides one set of answers, but the UN Convention on the Rights of
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Persons with Disabilities (the UNCRPD)1 offers another, apparently incompati-
ble, set.2 The MCA says that such a decision can be made if it is in someone’s
best interests and they cannot understand, retain, or use and weigh the relevant
information due to ‘an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the
mind or brain’.3 The UNCRPD, in contrast, has been interpreted to prohibit all
‘substituted decision-making’: deﬁned as any process in which a third party is ap-
pointed against someone’s will to make decisions for them; and the decision is
made in the person’s best interests, rather than according to the best interpreta-
tion of their will and preferences.4 Compelling points have been made against
both of these positions, and each has been given increasingly subtle interpreta-
tions to accommodate these objections.5 The resulting dialogue, however, does
little to dispel the impression that the core question is intractable; for, on this,
neither side has appreciably changed its answer.
This article does not solve the question of whether it is better to make decisions
for others in their bests interests or according to the best interpretation of their will
and preferences. Instead, it draws attention to a paradox that can occur in supportive
relationships. From this paradox, this article shows that best interests decision-making
against a person’s will, if it is justiﬁed in a liberal society, must be premised on the
decided-for person being unable to recognise that they have failed to recognise a
need. From this premise, two duties can be derived; and this allows any particular sys-
tem that uses a best interests standard, in this case the MCA, to be evaluated against
standards that it can be assumed to be implicitly committed to. This is not the same
task as assessing the Act against an external normative framework, such as the one
that the UNCRPD presents. Nevertheless, it is striking that if these duties were taken
seriously, then it would narrow, without entirely closing, the controversial gap be-
tween the two systems.
The next section develops an account of the paradox. Section III derives the ﬁrst
duty, the duty of identiﬁcation, and assesses the MCA against it. Section IV then evalu-
ates the extent to which legal requirements to provide advocacy might require compli-
ance with this duty. Finally, Section V derives the second duty, the duty to support, and
assesses the Act against this. For each duty, it is found that the MCA allows compliance,
1 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3
May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3.
2 Peter Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental
Health Law’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 752.
3 MCA 2005 s 1–4. An inability to communicate, under s 3(1)(d), is not relevant to a decision that someone
objects to.
4 UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘General Comment No 1’ (2014) UN Doc
CRPD/C/GC/1 para 27.
5 Elionoir Flynn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake, ‘The Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, Fiction, or
Fantasy?’ (2014) 32 Berkeley Journal of International Law 124; Wayne Martin and others, ‘Achieving
CRPD Compliance’ (Essex Autonomy Project 2014) 10–13; John Dawson, ‘A Realistic Approach to
Assessing Mental Health Laws’ Compliance with the UNCRPD’ (2015) 40 International Journal of Law
and Psychiatry 70; Lucy Series, ‘Relationships, Autonomy and Legal Capacity: Mental Capacity and
Support Paradigms’ (2015) 40 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 80; Piers Gooding, ‘Navigating
the “Flashing Amber Lights” of the Right to Legal Capacity in the UNCRPD: Responding to Major
Concerns’ (2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 45.
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but stops some way short of requiring it. In the conclusion, these limited criticisms of
the Act are reintegrated into the context of the wider debate.
I I . MENO’S PARADOX IN SUPPORTIVE RELATIONSHIPS
Meno’s paradox is presented by Plato in the dialogue of the same name. It is stated in
two ways: ﬁrst by Meno and then by Socrates.6 Socrates’ statement of the problem is
slightly clearer. He says:
[A] man cannot search either for what he knows or what he does not know. . .
He cannot search for what he knows – since he knows it, there is no need to
search – nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look
for.7
A common response to this paradox is to deny that knowledge is as binary as it sug-
gests. So, for instance, Fine interprets Plato’s Socrates as proposing a distinction be-
tween ‘knowledge’ and ‘true beliefs’.8 On this interpretation, we may believe things to
be true that are actually true without knowing why they are true.9 These true beliefs
then provide us with a starting point from which we can develop a deeper understand-
ing;10 and this understanding may, in time, develop to the point where we can give a
coherent account of why our beliefs are true. It is this ability to explain ‘why’ that dis-
tinguishes knowledge from belief.11 There is, however, a form of the paradox that this
distinction does not resolve.
Meno originally asks Socrates ‘how will you know it is the thing you didn’t
know?’12 This suggests a particularly difﬁcult problem, the problem of recognition.13
If knowledge requires being able to give an account of the reasons why a belief is true,
then those ‘reasons’ will inevitably refer to other beliefs that, to count as knowledge,
must in turn rely on even deeper reasons. There is no obvious end to this process,
and so no certain way of distinguishing between what you know and what you falsely
believe that you know.14 There is always the possibility that something we take to be
knowledge is actually premised on a deep unrecognised error. Sometimes, this is di-
rectly relevant to supportive relationships.
A paradox of recognition can occur in supportive relationships. This can be shown
by an example. Imagine a man called ‘John’, who has a large (over 9 cm) abdominal
aortic aneurysm that is growing rapidly. John wants to live. The diagnosis of such an
aneurysm is reliable, they are very likely to rupture, and rupture carries an extremely
6 Plato, ‘Meno’ in John M Cooper (ed), Plato: Complete Works (GMA Grube tr, Hackett 1997) 80d80e.
7 ibid 80e.
8 Gail Fine, ‘Inquiry in the Meno’ in Richard Kraut (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Plato (CUP 1992)
200, 206.
9 Perhaps because we simply accept what an authority, such as a teacher, says. Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival
Versions of Moral Enquiry (Duckworth 1990) 63.
10 Scott distinguishes between knowing ‘parrot fashion’ and ‘synoptically’. Dominic Scott, Plato’s Meno (CUP
2006) 102–03, 183–84.
11 Plato (n 6) 98.
12 ibid 80d.
13 Nicholas P White, Plato on Knowledge and Reality (Hackett 1976) 42–47.
14 Scott (n 10) 83–84.
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high risk of death.15 Assuming, for now, that there are no other complicating factors,
it is reasonable to say that John objectively needs a particular form of support: surgery.
Further imagine, however, that John does not recognise his need for this support. He
is asymptomatic, and simply disbelieves the diagnosis. In these circumstances, those
supporting him might want to help him to recognise that if he wishes to live, he needs
surgery. This is when the paradox appears. If John accepts this help—a second-order
support to recognise his need for ﬁrst-order support—then that may give us a reason
to suspect that he is not as certain as he seemed about not needing surgery. To accept
the second-order support shows some recognition of the fact that he may have the
ﬁrst-order need, surgery. This is the paradox; and, more importantly, it also works in
the opposite direction. If John truly does not recognise his need for surgery, then he
will not recognise that he has a reason to accept help to recognise that need. If a sup-
porter says, ‘we want to help you to see that you need surgery’, then he is likely to re-
ply ‘but I don’t need surgery’. Unless he is a particularly patient man, this might be
followed by a comment about how nobody is listening to him.
To this use of the paradox, it might be objected that John could recognise his need
for surgery yet refuse it. This raises two possibilities. An example of the ﬁrst would be
if John wished to live, and understood that he needed surgery to do so, but neverthe-
less decided that a religious prohibition made it impossible for him to accept the inter-
vention. In this case, however, there is good reason to doubt whether John truly
needs the surgery, no matter what his medical needs might be.16 In contrast, an exam-
ple of the second possibility would be if John wanted to live, and accepted that he
needed surgery to live, but nevertheless refused the intervention without being able to
give any reason why. In this case, however, what has occurred is not recognition. The
concern in these situations is with a practical question, not with someone’s ability to
assent to theoretical propositions; so ‘recognition’ here necessarily includes the ability
to make practical use of what has been recognised. This roughly accords with the nat-
ural use of the language. When, in this example, John agrees that he needs surgery to
live, he has clearly assented to a proposition. After he refuses the surgery for no dis-
cernible reason, however, it would be unusual to nevertheless say that he ‘recognises’
his need for surgery. In conclusion, in the ﬁrst example, John recognises an apparent
need but denies that in the circumstances it is a need for him; and in the second what
appears to be recognition is better characterised as mere assent. In neither case has
John recognised a need for him and yet refused surgery.
Examining this paradox can help to reveal one condition necessary to justify sys-
tems, such as the MCA, that allow decisions to be made in someone’s best interests
against their will. For such decisions to be justiﬁed, it is not enough that someone fail
to recognise a need; they must also fail to recognise that they have failed to recognise
the need. If a person can recognise their own ﬁrst-order needs, then they are capable
of recognising their own best interests; so, in a liberal society, there is no obvious justi-
ﬁcation for giving someone else the power to make such decisions for them. Beyond
15 FL Moll and others, ‘Management of Abdominal Aortic Aneurysms: Clinical Practice Guidelines of the
European Society for Vascular Surgery’ (2011) 41 European Journal of Vascular and Endovascular Surgery S1.
16 This point is dealt with in detail in the next section, but for now it is enough to observe that someone’s ob-
jective needs cannot be identiﬁed without taking into account their own understanding of their life.
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this, however, if someone does not recognise a ﬁrst-order need but knows that they
do not do so, then there is still no clear justiﬁcation for giving someone else the ability
to make decisions for them against their will. If, for example, John says ‘I must be miss-
ing something, you decide for me’, then the decision is not against his will. If, in con-
trast, he says ‘I must be missing something, please explain it to me again’, then there is
no clear justiﬁcation for ignoring his request for support and simply making the deci-
sion. When someone recognises their second-order need for help to identify their
ﬁrst-order needs, then less intrusive measures than a decision against their will are
necessarily available. In other words, if it is assumed that self-determination is gener-
ally good for people and that any legal suspension of it should be for a reason, then
the mere fact that people sometimes have needs that they cannot recognise is not
enough to justify best interests decisions against someone’s will. If such decisions are
justiﬁed, it must be because sometimes people fail to make the second-order recogni-
tion that they cannot recognise a ﬁrst-order need. That is to say, systems that allow
best interests decisions against a person’s will are only justiﬁed if people are some-
times caught in the paradox.
The argument in the previous paragraph does not demonstrate that best interests
decisions against a person’s will are ultimately justiﬁed. It may be that even if someone
is caught in the paradox, then making a decision against their will is still unjustiﬁed for
other reasons. For example, it might always cause signiﬁcantly more harm to the per-
son than respecting their preferences would. For this reason, reﬂecting on the paradox
cannot settle the clash between the MCA and the UNCRPD discussed in the intro-
duction. Nevertheless, if a second-order failure of recognition is necessary for a best
interests decision against someone’s will to be justiﬁed in a liberal society, then there
are implications. In particular, the power to make such decisions will plausibly carry
with it duties.
I I I . THE DUTY OF IDENTIFICATION
The previous section suggests that if best interests decisions made against someone’s
will are to be justiﬁed in a liberal society, then it is not enough that the person does
not recognise a ﬁrst-order need; they must also fail to recognise that they do not rec-
ognise a ﬁrst-order need. From this general form of the argument, a speciﬁc form can
be derived: in any particular case, a best interests decision against a person’s will is
only justiﬁed if they both fail to recognise a ﬁrst-order need and fail to recognise that
they are doing so. If it is assumed that decisions should only be made when it is justi-
ﬁed to do so, then from this speciﬁc form of the argument a duty can be derived: the
duty to identify whether someone is making such a second-order failure of recognition
before deciding against their will.
There is, however, a problem; for this duty can become ensnared in the paradox
that it is derived from. If the duty is fulﬁlled, a decision is only made when the person
cannot be helped to make the second-order recognition that they have failed to recog-
nise a ﬁrst-order need. If, though, the person, such as John in the original example, is
in this position, then they will deny that this is an accurate description of their situa-
tion. In other words, the same conditions that are necessary to justify the power to
make a decision also make the use of that power unlikely to be accepted. This has pro-
found consequences. So far, this article has largely taken a need as a simple objective
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fact, but, of course, no supporter will ever have unmediated access to the objective
facts. They will have, at best, a tangle of evidence from various sources about what
someone’s needs are. Furthermore, even a person’s objective needs will be inﬂuenced
by subjective factors. Even in the example, it was necessary to say that John wanted to
live. A person’s experiences and values partially shape their needs. This creates an evi-
dential problem, for each of us has an access to these subjective elements that an as-
sessor cannot equal. Atkins puts the point well: ‘appreciation of the subjective
character of experience brings with it the necessity for an epistemological humility’ on
the part of others.17 If the supported person has better access to some of the evidence,
then there is always the possibility that what appears to be a case of them failing to
recognise a need is actually a case of third parties attributing needs to them that they
do not have.18
Subjective elements shape our needs, so it will often be difﬁcult to show that some-
one has needs that they are failing to recognise. This does not, however, mean that
providing sufﬁcient evidence is always impossible. Unfortunately, the UN Committee
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities appears to have concluded otherwise. It
says that it is a ﬂaw to presume to be able to ‘accurately assess the inner-workings of
the human mind’.19 If this is a ﬂaw it is, as Dawson points out, one that can be found
throughout the legal system;20 but, beyond that, the Committee fails to apply its own
position consistently. Some evidence is only accessible to the supported person, but
this is seldom the only relevant evidence that is only accessible to one person.
Imagine John says that he doesn’t need surgery, and supports his claim by saying that
the doctors have kidnapped him in order to harvest his organs. In this case the staff,
by virtue of their subjective experience, will have access to evidence that is not avail-
able to John. Some of this evidence, for instance, the doctor’s intention to save John’s
life or her memories of learning how to interpret the relevant scans, will bear on the
question of what John’s needs actually are. The existence of subjective perspectives
does not, by itself, call into question the existence of objective needs. It just means
that these situations are evidentially complex.
Evidentially complex situations are not unusual. As Wimsatt points out, ‘for the
complex systems encountered in evolutionary biology and the social sciences, it is of-
ten unclear what is fundamental or trustworthy’.21 A common response is to seek ro-
bust results: if different types of measurement all return the same result, then that
result can be treated as more trustworthy.22 This idea of seeking robust results is rele-
vant here; for if the person concerned has access to evidence that cannot be gained in
any other way, then this implies that their own assessment of the situation should
17 Kim Atkins, ‘Autonomy and the Subjective Character of Experience’ (2000) 17 Journal of Applied
Philosophy 71.
18 Judges in the Court of Protection are aware of this danger. See, for example, V v Associated Newspapers
[2016] EWCOP 21 [67]–[68] (Charles J).
19 General Comment (n 4) para 15.
20 Dawson (n 5) 74.
21 William C Wimsatt, Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings (Harvard 2007) 56.
22 ibid ch 4. This process is not infallible. ‘Robust detection’ will break down if apparently independent mea-
surements are not truly independent. Brett Calcott, ‘Wimsatt and the Robustness Family’ (2011) 26
Biology and Philosophy 284.
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never simply be ignored. This in turn suggests that the duty of identiﬁcation is only
fulﬁlled if the person’s own perspective on their needs is sought out and treated as di-
rect evidence of whatever it is that they assert. Only if the countervailing evidence is
overwhelming should the person’s view be treated as evidence that they cannot recog-
nise an objectively existing need. In practice, this may equate to Banner and
Szmukler’s application of Davidson’s Principle of Charity: ‘we must assume that a
speaker is by and large consistent and correct in his beliefs’.23 Indeed, if a supporter
takes the opposite approach, and begins by taking a person’s disagreement as evidence
that they cannot identify their needs, then it is not the person who does not recognise
that they have failed to recognise something. It is the supporter.24 The approach
suggested here will not, of course, resolve every possible evidential problem. It cannot
address the question of what should ﬁrst trigger the suspicion that someone does not
recognise their own needs. It can only suggest what should be done when that suspi-
cion is already present. Similarly, it cannot help if it is suspected that someone cannot
recognise a need, but, despite every available support, they cannot or will not share
their own perspective. This last point can, however, be accommodated by acknowl-
edging that the duty of identiﬁcation requires starting with the person’s own perspec-
tive only when it is possible to do so.
If systems which allow best interests decisions against a person’s will should respect
the duty of identiﬁcation, and the duty of identiﬁcation requires someone’s testimony
to be treated as evidence of what they say before it is treated as evidence that they do
not understand, then this offers two criteria by which the MCA can be assessed. The
ﬁrst criterion is whether it recognises the duty of identiﬁcation at all, and the second
is whether it recognises that the duty entails this careful treatment of the person’s
own testimony. It meets the ﬁrst criterion. Capacity assessments under the MCA are
of someone’s ability to make a particular decision;25 and an inability to make a deci-
sion is speciﬁed as an inability to understand, retain, use, or weigh relevant informa-
tion; or an inability to communicate the decision.26 The statutory language is wider
than that derived from the paradox, but ‘relevant information’ includes the conse-
quences of the decision,27 and this seems close to being unable to identify your needs
in that particular situation. This impression is reinforced when the Act’s principles are
examined. Section 1(2) requires that someone is assumed to have capacity unless the
contrary is established. If being unable to understand or use information is analogous
with the content of the duty of identiﬁcation, then it is this section of the Act that
makes it a duty to undertake a process of identiﬁcation in every case. Furthermore,
this principle is reinforced elsewhere in the Act. Section 5(1) requires that, for acts ‘in
connection with’ care or treatment, ‘reasonable steps’ are taken to establish whether
the person has capacity; and section 1(3) requires ‘all practicable steps’ be taken to
23 Donald Davidson, ‘Psychology as Philosophy’ in Donald Davidson (ed), Essays on Actions and Events (OUP
2001) 229, 238; cited in Natalie F Banner and George Szmukler, ‘“Radical Interpretation” and the
Assessment of Decision-Making Capacity’ (2013) 30 Journal of Applied Philosophy 379.
24 Thanks to David Gibson for this point.
25 MCA (n 3) s 2(1); PC v City of York Council [2013] EWCA Civ 478, [2014] 2 WLR 1 [35] (McFarlane
LJ).
26 MCA (n 3) s 3(1).
27 ibid s 3(4).
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help someone to make a decision before they are treated as unable to do so. This last
section should distinguish between those who can be helped to recognise their needs
and those who cannot, and only allow decisions in the latter case. The Act, especially
this provision, has ‘not been widely implemented’;28 but it certainly recognises the ex-
istence of something broadly similar to the duty of identiﬁcation. Unfortunately, the
same cannot be said of the second criterion, the careful treatment of the person’s own
testimony.
The Act’s near silence on the question of evidence prevents it from requiring that
the person’s own testimony be treated with the care that the duty of identiﬁcation de-
mands. It does contain a few evidential prohibitions: incapacity cannot be established
merely because of an unwise decision; or because of a person’s condition, behaviour,
age, or appearance.29 It does not, however, indicate how the person’s own perspective
should be treated. The Code of Practice examines capacity assessments in more detail
than the Act,30 but it does not mention the person’s perspective in this context.
Although it discusses the possibility of challenging a capacity assessment,31 the stan-
dard against which the assessment will be measured is that of the Act and Code;32 so
this takes things no further. Worse yet, an ambiguity in the language of the Code may
mislead. It says that ‘nobody can be forced to undergo an assessment of capacity’.33
At face value, this would appear to mean that people have the ability to veto their own
capacity assessment; although framed in an unhelpfully confrontational way, this
would mean that their perspective would have to be taken into account. The Code
has not been read in this way, as the ‘DD’ series of cases illustrate. In these cases, there
was consensus that ‘threats or attempts to force DD to agree to an assessment are not
acceptable’,34 but it was nevertheless declared lawful to remove her from her home
‘by force’ to a place where assessment could take place.35 Her lack of cooperation
with the subsequent assessment was respected;36 but, importantly, this did not pre-
vent her from being found to lack capacity to make decisions about litigation, contra-
ception, and sterilisation.37 In other words, DD could decline to take part in her
capacity assessment, but that assessment took place without her anyway. There is no
right to veto your own capacity assessment, and the Act contains no less extreme way
to ensure that the person’s own testimony is given a fair hearing, so the MCA fails to
require that the second criterion of the duty of identiﬁcation is fulﬁlled.
28 Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, ‘Mental Capacity Act 2005: Post-Legislative Scrutiny’
(2013–14, HL Paper 139) para 79–83, 103–10.
29 MCA (n 3) s 1(4), 2(3). The word ‘merely’ is signiﬁcant—these factors can have evidential force if they do
not individually determine the question—D v R (the Deputy of S) [2010] EWCOP 2405, [2011] WTLR
449 [40] (Henderson J).
30 Department for Constitutional Affairs, The Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (The Stationery
Ofﬁce 2007) ch 4.
31 ibid para 4.63–4.65.
32 ibid para 4.64.
33 ibid para 4.59.
34 The Mental Health Trust v DD (No. 3) [2014] EWCOP 13, 142 BMLR 156 [36] (Cobb J).
35 ibid [37]–[41].
36 The Mental Health Trust v DD (No.4) [2014] EWCOP 44 [5] and, [8]; The Mental Health Trust v DD
(No. 5) [2015] EWCOP 4 [135] (Cobb J).
37 ibid The Mental Health Trust v DD (No. 4) [13]; The Mental Health Trust v DD (No. 5) [63], [80].
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It seems likely that the Act’s failure to ensure that someone’s own testimony is
treated as evidence contributes to such testimony being discounted in practice.
Empirical studies show that a disagreement between an assessor and the person as-
sessed can sometimes be taken as evidence that the person ‘lacks insight’, without ﬁrst
taking the disagreement as a reason to question the validity of the assessment.38 A
lack of insight appears to be strongly correlated with a ﬁnding of incapacity,39 so the
uncritical use of this concept is likely to have consequences. Professionals using ‘in-
sight’ uncritically have been corrected by the Court of Protection,40 but judges, too,
sometimes seem to use the concept in an indiscriminate way.41 When this happens, a
person’s disagreement can be discounted if they lack insight, and their disagreement is
evidence that they lack insight;42 so it becomes ‘impossible to disbelieve a doctor and
retain capacity’.43 Here, the duty of identiﬁcation has become entangled in the para-
dox that it was derived from; and it is the assessor, not the person assessed, who has
failed to recognise what it is that they do not recognise. The Act allows this situation
to be avoided. It does not, however, require that it be avoided.
IV . ADVOCACY AND THE DUTY OF IDENTIFICATION
Since the MCA was passed, the perspective of the decided-for person has become a
more prominent issue; and the effects of this new prominence can already be seen in
domestic law, particularly in changes to the legal framework governing the provision
of advocacy. These developments bring the law closer to requiring compliance with
the second criterion of the duty of identiﬁcation, but there are, however, limits to
what advocacy can achieve in this respect. This section discusses the recent legislation,
then its limits. First, however, it examines the advocacy provisions of the MCA.
The MCA requires an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate (IMCA) to be ap-
pointed when someone is thought to lack capacity, and has no-one else to speak on
their behalf; and faces serious medical treatment, a long-term change of accommoda-
tion, or a deprivation of liberty.44 IMCAs can challenge capacity decisions,45 so they
offer an avenue for challenging assessments that ignore the person’s own testimony.
Nevertheless, unless appointed under section 39D of the Act when someone is de-
prived of their liberty,46 they are consulted to help determine what would be in the
38 Val Williams and others, ‘Making Best Interests Decisions: People and Processes’ (Mental Health
Foundation 2012) <http://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/content/assets/PDF/publications/best_interests_
report_FINAL1.pdf?view¼Standard> accessed 21 June 2015, 55–58; Charlotte Emmett, ‘Homeward
Bound or Bound for a Home? Assessing the Capacity of Dementia Patients to Make Decisions about
Hospital Discharge: Comparing Practice with Legal Standards’ (2013) 36 International Journal of Law and
Psychiatry 73, 77.
39 GS Owen and others, ‘Mental capacity, diagnosis and insight in psychiatric in-patients: a cross-sectional
study’ (2008) 39 Psychological Medicine 1389.
40 KK v STCC [2012] EWCOP 2136 [36],[64](Baker J).
41 Islington LBC v QR [2014] EWCOP 26, (2014) 17 CCL Rep 344 [96] (Batten DJ); An English Local
Authority v SW [2014] EWCOP 43, [2015] COPLR 29 [20] (Moylan J).
42 Kate Diesfeld and Stefan Sjo¨stro¨m, ‘Interpretive Flexibility: Why Doesn’t Insight Incite Controversy in
Mental Health Law?’ (2007) 25 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 85.
43 Neil Allen, ‘Is Capacity “In Sight”?’(2009) 19 Journal of Mental Health Law 165, 167.
44 MCA (n 3) ss 37–39E.
45 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (IMCAs) (General) Regulations 2006 reg 7(1)(b).
46 AJ v A Local Authority [2015] EWCOP 5, (2015) 18 CCLR 158 [107–11].
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person’s best interests.47 This leads to an ambiguity. If the IMCA believes that the
person lacks capacity, then they might not challenge an assessment that the person
disagrees with; for they might not believe that it is in the person’s best interests to do
so.48 In other words, IMCAs are merely allowed, not required, to argue for the per-
son’s own perspective.
The advocacy provisions in the Care Act 2014 are more robust than those in the
MCA, and provide a useful contrast, as the trigger for advocacy is still framed in terms
of ability to make a decision. The newer Act requires an advocate to be appointed dur-
ing needs assessments, care planning, or safeguarding processes;49 if ‘the individual
would experience substantial difﬁculty’ making a decision, and no-one else can repre-
sent and support them.50 This is a lower bar than in the MCA, for ‘substantial difﬁ-
culty’ does not require the person to be thought to lack capacity;51 but a more
relevant difference between the two Acts is in what, exactly, the advocate is required
to do once appointed. Under the Care Act, an advocate is required to communicate
the ‘views, wishes, or feelings’ of a person thought to lack capacity,52 and the statutory
guidance reinforces this as a duty to put forward the person’s own case.53 This goes
further than the MCA towards robustly fulﬁlling the second criterion of the duty of
identiﬁcation, and it may also inﬂuence the older Act. The Law Commission has sug-
gested that IMCAs ‘be replaced by a system of Care Act advocacy’; this would incor-
porate the more robust standard into the MCA itself.54
Strengthening the law governing the provision of advocacy is a step towards requir-
ing compliance with the duty of identiﬁcation, but it has limits. These limits are of
three types: limits of scope, limits in implementation, and cultural limits. The legisla-
tion itself has limited scope. Only certain decisions trigger the duty to appoint an ad-
vocate. Between the two Acts, many major decisions will be covered, but it is not
clear that all will be; and, as has been acknowledged in Parliament, ‘minor’ decisions
can be as important to the person concerned as ‘major’ ones.55 In practice, however,
limitations in implementation are likely to be more severe than those of scope.
Failures of implementation were the most consistent theme of the recent House of
Lords Select Committee Report into the MCA,56 and IMCAs are not always ap-
pointed even when it is legally required.57 Legislation requiring advocacy of a certain
level is not, by itself, sufﬁcient to ensure that practice will consistently reach that level;
47 MCA (n 3) ss 37(1)(b), 38(1), 39(1)(b), 39A(1)(b), 39C(1)(c).
48 Select Committee (n 28) para 167.
49 Care Act 2014 ss 67(1), (3), 68(1).
50 ibid ss 67(4) and 68(3).
51 Department of Health, ‘Care and Support Statutory Guidance’ (2014) paras 7.55, 7.58.
52 The Care and Support (Independent Advocacy Support) Regulations 2014 reg 5(7).
53 Statutory Guidance (n 51) para 7.43.
54 Law Commission, ‘Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty: A Consultation Paper’ (Consultation
Paper No 222, 2015) para 9.41.
55 Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Incapacity Bill, ‘First Report’(2002–2003, HL Paper 189-l, HC 1083-
I) para 27.
56 Select Committee (n 28).
57 Department of Health, ‘The Seventh Year of the Independent Mental Capacity Advocacy (IMCA) Service’
(2015) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/416341/imca-
report.pdf> accessed 10 August 2015, 34.
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and the current political and economic climate is relevant here. Local authority bud-
gets have fallen by almost 40% in real terms over the last ﬁve years, and authorities
have lost their ability to insulate social care from the effects of this drop in funding;
yet the overall need for care is increasing dramatically.58 In these circumstances, advo-
cacy may be neglected; and the provision of more ‘basic’ physical care prioritised.
Scope and implementation offer relatively contingent limits to advocacy. Changes
to the legislation, or to practice and funding, could overcome them. There are, how-
ever, also cultural limits to the ability of an advocate to fulﬁl the duty of identiﬁcation,
and these will be harder to overcome. These cultural limits gain their force from the
paradox, but to show this requires careful disambiguation. The example of John can
help. If an advocate wants to represent John’s own perspective as faithfully as possible,
then she faces a choice. John both wishes to live and wishes to refuse life-saving sur-
gery. If she presents either of these wishes alone, then she will not fully represent
John’s relevant views, but if she presents both, then she will undermine John’s case by
emphasising its contradictions. In these cases, then, presenting what someone wants
without explaining why they want it is insufﬁcient. Instead, an advocate should present
the person’s overall view, for example, John’s view that refusing surgery will not risk
his life, and the reasons why that view should prevail.59
If an advocate attempts to present the reasons why someone’s view should prevail,
then another choice reveals itself. This is the choice between only presenting John’s
reasons for his view and also presenting other reasons for reaching the same view.
With regards to the duty of identiﬁcation, these are different things. If the advocate
presents John’s reasons for his view, then she is helping to ensure that his perspective
is treated as evidence, as the duty requires. If, however, she offers reasons which are
not John’s for why John’s wishes should prevail, then a shift in argumentation has oc-
curred. Proposing reasons that are not John’s does not help to show that John under-
stands the relevant information and hence has capacity. Instead, the advocate is
effectively arguing that regardless of whether John has capacity or not, his wishes
should prevail. This is no longer about the duty of identiﬁcation; it does not bear on
the question of whether John recognises his needs. There are good reasons for keeping
these two lines of argumentation distinct. Being found to have capacity is not the same
as being found to lack capacity but nevertheless having your wishes followed. A ﬁnding
of incapacity can carry costs to the person beyond simply not getting what they want:
for instance, self-stigmatisation and loss of conﬁdence.60 Beyond this, it is only by dis-
ambiguating between the two that the cultural limits on advocacy can be made clear.
The distinction between advancing someone’s own reasons for their view and pre-
senting other reasons for why that view should prevail makes it easier to see the cul-
tural limits on the ability of an advocate to fulﬁl the duty of identiﬁcation. An
advocate’s position will often, regrettably, give her more credibility than the person
themselves, but this credibility has limits, and some of these limits are cultural. If,
58 National Audit Ofﬁce, ‘Care Act First-Phase Reforms’ (2015–2016, HC 82) paras 1.6–1.9.
59 The same point is true of ‘wishes and feelings’ in best interests decisions: Laura Pritchard-Jones, ‘This Man
with Dementia – Othering the Person with Dementia in the Court of Protection’, Medical Law Review
(forthcoming).
60 Bruce J Winick, ‘The Side Effects of Incompetency Labelling and the Implications for Mental Health Law’
(1995) 1 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 6.
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again, John is paranoid and believes that he has been kidnapped so that his organs can
be harvested, but is actually ill in hospital, then an advocate arguing that his reasons
for refusing treatment are literally true will not help him. She will only harm her own
credibility. For a reason to be convincing, it must have some coherence with the ac-
count of the world that listeners assume to be true. This is not, by itself, a problematic
limit: in John’s case, even a charitable treatment of his testimony should almost cer-
tainly conclude that he is failing to recognise a need. It does, however, indicate where
the problematic cultural limits to advocacy are. Experimental psychology has shown
the existence of implicit social biases. These biases are entirely distinct to someone’s
explicit attitudes, they are robust, and they predict behaviour.61 In other words, people
consistently act on biases that they deny, and may not even perceive. In particular,
strong implicit biases against those with disabilities have been shown to be wide-
spread, even among professionals who work closely with them.62 These biases, com-
bined with the need for a person’s reasons to have some minimal coherence with
commonly held assumptions to be credible, are sufﬁcient to impose limits on advo-
cacy’s power to fulﬁl the duty of identiﬁcation. Recognising the existence of wide-
spread unacknowledged bias entails recognising the risk that sometimes when a
person’s reasons seem unconvincing, because they do not cohere with the commonly
accepted view of the world, it is society, not the person, which has not recognised its
failure to recognise signiﬁcant facts. Furthermore, when the paradox reappears in this
societal form, it limits advocates in two ways. First, advocates may be implicitly biased;
for explicit opposition to discrimination does not guarantee that someone is not im-
plicitly biased.63 Secondly, if the advocate is not biased, and others are, then arguing
for the person’s perspective will risk the advocate’s credibility in the same way, if sel-
dom to the same extent, that arguing John really was going to have his organs har-
vested did. The advocate will literally be arguing against what ‘everyone knows’.
These cultural limits will be difﬁcult to address: implicit biases may be difﬁcult to
change,64 and such biases against those with disabilities do not seem to have fallen in
the last decade.65 They are, however, only limits. An area of freedom should remain in
which an advocate can challenge biases without destroying their own credibility; and
if that balance is difﬁcult to ﬁnd, then this is an argument for strong advocacy, not
against it. Nevertheless, the cultural limits on advocacy, in combination with the limits
of scope and in implementation, do mean that while stronger advocacy legislation is a
step towards requiring that a person’s testimony is treated with due care, it is only one
step. Others will almost certainly be needed.
61 Kristin A Lane and others, ‘Implicit Social Cognition and Law’ (2007) 3 Annual Review of Law and Social
Science 427; Brian A Nosek and others, ‘Implicit Social Cognition: From Measures to Mechanisms’ (2011)
15 Trends in Cognitive Sciences 152.
62 Michelle Clare Wilson and Katrina Scior, ‘Attitudes Towards Individuals with Disabilities as Measured by
the Implicit Association Test: A literature review’ (2014) 35 Research in Developmental Disabilities 294.
63 Lane and others (n 61) 431.
64 Jennifer A Joy-Gaba and Brian A Nosek, ‘The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of Implicit Racial
Evaluations’ (2010) 41 Social Psychology 137.
65 Wilson and Scior (n 62) 319.
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V. THE DUTY TO SUPPORT
In addition to the duty of identiﬁcation, a duty to provide support can be derived
from the paradox; and, as with the ﬁrst duty, this offers a criterion by which legal sys-
tems that permit best interests decisions against a person’s will can be evaluated. At
the outset, however, it should be stressed that ‘support’ in this context is limited to
support of one particular, relatively narrow, type. It is support to someone who has
had a decision made for them because of a second-order failure of recognition, which
is directed at helping them to avoid such failures in the future. There are further limits
on this support—in particular, it cannot be against the person’s will—that are dis-
cussed below. First, however, this section shows how the duty follows from the
paradox.
As argued in Sections II and III, deciding against a person’s will can only be justi-
ﬁed if someone cannot recognise that they do not recognise a need. At the same time,
however, interfering with someone’s self-determination is understood in liberal socie-
ties to be wrongful. Indeed, this understanding motivates the general principles of
both the MCA66 and the UNCRPD.67 On a simplistic reading, this general prohibi-
tion on interfering with someone’s self-determination is entirely displaced when their
second-order failure of recognition justiﬁes making a decision against their will. Such
a reading is, however, too simplistic; for it collapses the difference between doing an
unqualiﬁedly right act and doing a justiﬁed wrong.68 Making a decision against some-
one’s will because of their second-order failure of recognition is not an unqualiﬁedly
right act. The very structure of this description denies it. It presents an apparent
wrong, making the decision against their will; and then presents a reason, the failure
of recognition, for nevertheless doing it. It is, at best, a justiﬁed wrong; and this is im-
portant. Justiﬁed wrongs are necessarily cases in which moral conﬂicts have occurred
and been resolved; but, as Williams observes, such conﬂicts are not ‘all soluble without
remainder’.69 One ‘remainder’ he examines is the regret that an ‘admirable moral
agent’ might feel, even when they are acting as well as circumstances seem to allow.70
This is a good starting place; for it seems right to feel some regret if we have made a
decision against someone’s will, even if we are sure that doing so is justiﬁed in the par-
ticular case. Furthermore, it seems right that, as Williams says,71 someone experienc-
ing such regret might conclude that they ought to avoid such situations arising in the
future. In the particular case, the moral conﬂict has arisen because someone has not
recognised that they do not recognise a need; so a regretful decision-maker might
conclude that, where possible, they should help the decided-for person to avoid such
second-order failures of recognition in the future. This, then, is the derivation of the
duty to support. If it is accepted that a decision against a person’s will is not an un-
qualiﬁedly good act but a justiﬁed wrong, that the appropriate response to inﬂicting
66 MCA (n 3) s 1.
67 UNCRPD (n 1) art 3(a).
68 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (OUP 2001) 44–49 discusses this distinction.
69 Bernard Williams, ‘Ethical Consistency’ in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed), Essays on Moral Realism (Cornell
UP 1988) 41, 52.
70 ibid 49.
71 ibid 50.
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this justiﬁed wrong is regret, and that the appropriate response to such regret is to at-
tempt to avoid such situations occurring in the future, then there is an apparent duty
once a decision has been made against someone’s will to attempt to help them to
avoid second-order failures of recognition in the future. This is an endoxic derivation,
it appeals to widely held evaluative beliefs;72 so it can be rejected by someone who
denies regret is an appropriate response to inﬂicting a justiﬁed wrong, or denies that
we should act on such regret. Nevertheless, neither of those positions seems particu-
larly appealing, so it does have some force. The duty to support, however, also faces
an internal challenge.
Just like the duty of identiﬁcation, the duty to support can become ensnared by the
paradox that it is derived from. If the justiﬁcation for making a decision against some-
one’s will is that the person could not be helped to recognise their failure to recognise
a need, then to claim that there is, nevertheless, a duty to provide this same help
seems absurd, doomed to failure from the outset. This objection may hold true in
some cases; and in those cases, if they can be reliably identiﬁed, there is no obvious
duty to support. Few cases, however, are likely to be of this type. Just because we can-
not help someone to recognise their own failure of recognition at one time does not
mean that we cannot do so over a longer time period. Therefore, despite the entangle-
ment of the paradox, the duty to support will still exist in most cases. It will, however,
be limited in another way; for it cannot be used to justify decisions against a person’s
will. Before discussing this limit, however, it is worth evaluating whether the MCA rec-
ognises the duty at all.
The MCA may seem to recognise the duty to support. After all, section 1(3) re-
quires ‘all practicable steps’ be taken to support someone to make a decision; and sec-
tion 4(4) that someone is encouraged and permitted to improve their ability to take
part in decisions affecting them, insofar as that is ‘reasonably practicable’. These provi-
sions do not, however, require fulﬁlment of the duty to support; and this is, in part,
due to the same ‘decision-speciﬁc’ structure of the Act that buttresses the duty of iden-
tiﬁcation. Section 1(3) only requires that someone be helped to make the particular
decision in question. It does not create any duty that continues after the decision is
made, but it is then that the duty of support arises. Similarly, section 4(4) requires
that the person’s ‘ability to participate’ be supported during best interests decisions,
but it, too, is speciﬁc to the particular decision being made. It does not create any on-
going duty.73 When a cohesive team is working well with the person, then an on-
going duty to support might, nevertheless, emerge from these sections. As Series
points out, however, both decision-making and support under the MCA are ‘dispersed
over a large number of disparate actors’,74 so the Act does nothing to encourage this
sort of practice. Therefore, as with the duty of identiﬁcation, the MCA allows the duty
to support to be recognised, but does not require it.
72 Martha C Nussbaum, ‘Aristotle, Nature, and Ethics’ in JEJ Altham and Ross Harrison (eds), World, Mind,
and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (CUP 1995) 86, 100.
73 Indeed, it only arises when ‘the time for supported decision-making is past’. Re NRA [2015] EWCOP 59
[56] (Charles J).
74 Series (n 5) 84.
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It may be that the MCA is the wrong place to look for the duty to support. The
provision of support, beyond that required for the immediate decision, could simply
be beyond its remit. After all, as Lady Hale says, the Act is ‘concerned with enabling
the court to do for the patient what he could do for himself if of full capacity, but it
goes no further’.75 This point has been reinforced in the Court of Appeal: acting in
someone’s best interests grants no additional power ‘to obtain resources or facilities
from a third party’.76 Given this, it is worth again looking to the Care Act 2014. After
all, it gives local authorities duties to promote ‘control by the individual over day-to-
day life’77 and to ‘reduce the needs for care and support of adults in its area’.78 At ﬁrst
sight, it seems possible to read a duty to help someone to recognise their own needs
into these provisions, but, unfortunately, the detail of the Act makes this unlikely to
consistently happen. Local authorities only have a duty to provide for needs that meet
the ‘eligibility criteria’,79 and these criteria refer only to ﬁrst-order needs, such as main-
taining nutrition.80 Some service providers may decide that supporting someone to
identify their own needs in the long term is the best way to help them to meet those
needs; and local authorities can provide services when they have no duty to do so.81
Nevertheless, as with the MCA, there is nothing in the Care Act that makes fulﬁlling
the duty to support required, instead of merely allowed.
Beyond failing to require the duty to support, the MCA also fails to recognise the
limits of support. Words like ‘support’ can be slippery; and it is easy to envisage a
duty to help someone to recognise that they have not recognised their needs quietly
becoming a power to force someone to accept our assessment of their needs. Berlin’s
famous warning, ‘to manipulate men, to propel them towards goals which you – the
social reformer – see, but they may not, is to deny their human essence’,82 is as apt
here as it is anywhere. One way to avoid this slippage is to return to the paradox, and
to remember that deciding against a person’s will is only justiﬁed when they do not
recognise their failure to recognise a ﬁrst-order need. If making a decision against
someone’s will does not make it possible to satisfy the ﬁrst-order need, then this justi-
ﬁcation fails. This is what happens with the duty to support. If we say ‘due to the para-
dox, John cannot be helped to recognise his need for surgery, so we must decide for
him’, then a decision to operate can be implemented without any further input from
John. In contrast, if we say ‘John cannot be helped to recognise his need to recognise
his needs, so we must decide for him’, then we cannot make the second-order recogni-
tion happen without John’s input, no matter what we decide. The subjective character
75 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67 [18].
76 Re MN [2015] EWCA Civ 411 [80] (Munby P). This case has been granted permission to appeal to the
Supreme Court.
77 Care Act (n 49) s 1(2)(d).
78 ibid s 2(1)(c).
79 ibid s 18(1).
80 The Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) Regulations 2014, SI 2015/313, reg 2(2) The regulations do
mention ‘accessing and engaging in work, training, education or volunteering’ —reg 2(2)(h)—but this re-
fers to someone’s ability to access existing programs. There is nothing to indicate that it requires the provi-
sion of the support discussed here.
81 Care Act (n 49) s 19(1).
82 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concept of Liberty’ in Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (eds), The Proper Study of
Mankind: An Anthology of Essays (Pimlico 1998) 191, 203.
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of recognition dictates that it can only be reached by minimally consensual means; so
the duty to support cannot justiﬁably be extended to decisions against a person’s will.
The MCA, however, does not distinguish between these two different situations; so it
permits the meaning of ‘support’ to slip beyond reasonable bounds. For instance, in
Northamptonshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust v ML,83 a young man, ‘ML’, was
given an ‘opportunity to fulﬁl his potential’ to be independent. The ‘opportunity’ in-
volved a detention of up to two years in hospital and involuntary treatment that he
would undoubtedly ﬁnd traumatic.84 It is unlikely that he experienced this as an op-
portunity or as support; and if he did not, then it must be doubted whether it really
was these things. The MCA both fails to require respect for the duty of support, and
fails to prevent ‘support’ sliding into unjustiﬁed coercion.
VI . CONCLUSION
Meno’s paradox clariﬁes one condition necessary for the justiﬁcation of a best interest
decision against someone’s will. It suggests that it is not enough that someone has
failed to recognise a ﬁrst-order need, but they must also fail to recognise their own
failure of recognition. From this necessary condition, two duties can be derived: a
duty to identify that any particular person is in this position before deciding against
their will; and a duty to support those decided for to avoid this situation in the future.
Any particular legislation that allows best interests decisions against a person’s will
can be measured against these duties. The MCA allows the fulﬁlment of these duties,
but it does not robustly require them. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that the re-
cent House of Lords report found the ‘empowering ethos’ of the Act’s general princi-
ples has yet to be realised.85 The failure to require compliance with the two duties is
not due to those principles. It is, rather, due to the ﬁner details of the Act and other
legislation; some of which could, perhaps, be changed. The duty of identiﬁcation re-
quires that, during capacity assessments, the person’s testimony is treated primarily as
evidence of what they assert and only secondarily as evidence that they cannot recog-
nise their needs. Changes to the legal framework governing the provision of advocacy
has already brought the law closer to doing this, but there are important limits to
what advocacy can achieve by itself. The second duty, the duty to support, could be
given a legal basis by making a person’s inability to recognise their other needs an eli-
gible need under the Care Act. The MCA, however, also allows ‘support’ to slip into
unjustiﬁed coercion, and this problem would have to be addressed separately.
This article shows that the MCA only allows, and does not robustly require, re-
spect for two duties that any liberal system that allows best interests decisions against
a person’s will should be committed to. It does not, however, demonstrate whether or
not best interests decisions are ultimately justiﬁed; and, given this, it does not support
either the maintenance of the status quo, or the abandonment of all best interests de-
cision-making that has been called for under some interpretations on the UNCRPD.
Nevertheless, Meno’s paradox also presents a challenge to those who favour the latter
view; for they would appear to be committed to one of three following responses to
83 [2014] EWCOP 2, [2014] COPLR 439 [45] (Hayden J).
84 ibid [24], [59].
85 Select Committee (n 28) para 104.
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it: either that no one is ever caught in the paradox; or that those who are so caught
should be allowed to suffer whatever avoidable harms follow from their second-order
failures of recognition; or that third parties can interpret someone’s ‘will and prefer-
ences’ in ways that contradict what the person actually says. A detailed examination of
these positions is beyond the remit of this article, but the ﬁrst response appears false,
the second callous, and the third sinister. Despite this, taking seriously the response to
the paradox discussed here would seem to narrow, without entirely closing, the gap
between the MCA and the UNCRPD. It would require increased attention to the per-
son’s perspective during capacity assessments, and at least one form of additional, con-
sensual support. These are both things that align well with the overall aims and ethos
of the UN Convention.
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